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THE RUSSIAN JUDICIARY ACT OF 1922
AND SOME COMMENTS ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE IN THE SOVIET UNION
W. J. WAGNERt
During his recent research in the National Archives in Washington,
Professor Boleslaw Szczesniak, of the University of Notre Dame, found
two interesting texts which appear in their entirety following this article.'
Attached to Dispatch No. 632 from the American Representative in Riga
(1923) were: a summary in English of a report of the Acting Commis-
sar of Justice of the Russian Republic, Krylenko,2 on a bill concerning
the organization of courts in the Republic, and the English translation of
the final version of the act, as adopted on October 31, 1922.' The act has
never been published in English until now. This Judiciary Act set the
foundation for the organization of courts in the Russian Republic, which
-with some changes-is still valid today. The Russian pattern, of
course, influenced, or was copied by, the other Soviet Republics.
That the abuses, arbitrariness, and corruption of the Tsarist admin-
istration incurred the wrath of the liberal as well as of the left wing of
Russian public opinion needs no elaboration. However, the admin-
istration of justice in pre-revolutionary Russia, particularly after the
reform of 1864, was quite liberal and satisfactory.4 The participation
of assessors and justices of the peace who were elected added a demo-
cratic flavor to the system.
After a revolution, coup d' itat or some other upheaval in the gov-
ernmental system, the victorious new regime may select one of two ways
to implement its political theories: either by a gradual replacement of
the old law and institutions by new enactments and reorganization pro-
cedures, or by abolishing all that existed until then, creating a vacuum,
and beginning to build a new order from scratch. Post-World-War II
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. The texts were transcribed by Mr. Stefan Maczynsld, at that time Prof.
Szczesniak's assistant, and at present, Professor of Political Science at St. John Fisher
College.
2. Krylenko became the Union's Commissar of Justice after this post was
established in 1936, and then was purged and executed as a traitor.
3. The act was adopted in 1922; however, some authors state that the date is
1923. See, e.g., Gsovsxi, I Sovixr CIviL LAW, 233 n.1 (1948). It seems that the
confusion is due to the fact that in the official publication of the act, RussIAN SocIALIsT
FEDEAT"ED Sovi=r REPULc LAWS at p. 902 (1923), the year has been erroneously
given as 1923.
4. For details, see GsovsxI & GZYBOWSKI, I GoVERmENT, LAW AND COURTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 511-13 (1959).
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Poland may serve as an example of the first approach.' An example of
the second approach would be Communist China which declared the old
legal order as extinct in toto, with the result that for a period of time the
country did not live under any legal rules.6 In the field of the adminis-
tration of justice, one possibility is to retain the old courts (with a
gradual introduction of changes) and staff them as quickly as possible
with new members, and the other-to abolish the old judicial system alto-
gether. The triumphant bolsheviks, desirous of severing all connections
with the "bourgeois" past, decided to take the latter step. The first case
in a new court was heard on December 16, 1917.'
The vacuum created by the abolishment of the old machinery for
the administration of justice was not filled overnight.8 The new regime
had more urgent problems to take care of. The very question of its sur-
vival was at stake for quite a long time. Resistance on the part of
"White" Russians and the moderates, internal struggles in the ranks of
the communists, sporadic threats from some other groups such as the
anarchists, independence claims of large minorities such as the Ukraini-
ans, the war with Poland, which-initially successful-soon turned into a
disaster, all those tribulations and uncertainties made the continued ex-
istence of the first communist state in the world subject to much doubt.
Silent leges inter arma. In the general state of lawlessness, justice (or
injustice) was administered by the strong, usually by the red army and
the revolutionary police. Even after the first decrees on the establish-
ment of the new courts were enacted, nobody hurried to have those de-
5. The pre-war Polish legal system was not abolished in a sweeping manner by
the new communist government. Some laws and decrees abrogated old provisions which
could seem at variance with the new political reality in the country. The government
enacted some general principles and rules which lent themselves to various interpreta-
tions. Former Polish judicial decisions were declared by a plenary session of the
Supreme Court, in 1948, as good law if not "repugnant to the present system of govern-
ment and the statutes which are in force." Wagner, The Interplay of Planned Economy
and Traditional Contract Rules in Poland, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 348, 364 (1962).
6. McAleary, The People's Courts in Communist China, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 52
(1962). A somehow intermediate approach was taken by Yugoslavia. "All the Yugo-
slav laws enacted before the second world war were declared null and void by a law
enacted in 1945. This law also prescribed that provisions of the former laws could be
applied as 'legal rules' provided that they were not contrary to the new social system
and that there were no new prescriptions regulating the matter in question!' KAXoR,
INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL USAGES oF TRADE 4 (1964). (Published in the English
translation by the Institute of Comparative Law in Belgrade.)
7. HAZARD, SETrLING DispuTEs IN SoviE SociErT, 1 (1960).
8. This state of affairs resulted in a deplorable atmosphere of lawlessness, in
which the breaching of an obligation or the commission of an offense was indulged in
by some persons taking advantage of their impunity. Even after the new tribunals
were established, they lacked prestige and had a hard time in convincing the parties
that their decisions should be respected. HAZARD, VIII LE DROIT soviEriQUE ET LE
DtPERISSEMENT DE L' ETAT 32 (1960). (In Univ. Libre de Bruxelles, Facult de Droit,
Travaux et Conferences.)
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crees implemented. Besides, the decrees were sketchy and fragmentary.
For example, initially there were no provisions for any appellate and su-
preme court jurisdiction.
For the English-speaking reader, there are some excellent publica-
tions describing the development of the judicial organization in the So-
viet Union,9 and it seems unnecessary to repeat here the information,
comments and analysis given by some outstanding scholars in the field of
Soviet law. All that should be done in presenting the Judiciary Act of
1922 is to place it in its proper setting.
The first observation which comes to the mind of a student of the
Soviet system in its historical development is the necessity of approach-
ing the problem of the administration of justice by the courts in conjunc-
tion with the power of non-judicial bodies to impose penalties, the om-
nipotence of the communist party, and the discrepancy between the printed
word and actual practice. The political reality in the Soviet Union is
stronger than any theoretical considerations or nicely formulated rules
on human rights, due process, rule of law, fair procedure, etc. All those
terms may be used in the Western as well as in the Soviet legal systems,
but their meaning and application may be completely different. It would
be grossly misleading to rely only on the text of the statutes dealing with
the administration of justice and draw far-reaching conclusions as to the
situation in the Soviet Union. For example, the very concept of "democ-
racy" and "democratic elections" conveys quite different connotations in
the West and East. Therefore, the reading of some official Soviet pub-
lications1" without proper preparation and ability to take a comparative
approach does not enable one to draw useful conclusions. And a dis-
service is rendered by Western commentators who despite frequent warn-
ings by realistically minded comparatists"1 seemingly do not realize that
statute books cannot be analyzed in abstracto, in detachment from the so-
ciety in which they are being applied.12
To some extent, this discrepancy exists in every legal system. It
would be an error, for instance, in studying the organization of American
courts, to assume that all disputes are settled by the system of regular
courts, ignoring administrative quasi-judicial procedures, frequent resort
to arbitration in some types of controversies, and factors which prompt
9. And particularly, BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. (1963). Gsovsia &
GnzYowsza, op. cit. supra note 4, at 511-87; Gsovsxr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 233-56,
836-46; HAzARD, op. cit. supra note 7.
10. Such as RoMASH iN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SovIET LAW (1962); or DENxsOV &
KRCHENKO, SovIET SrTTE LAW (1960).
11. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 491-97 (2d ed. 1959).
12. Such is apparently the case of DEKKERS, PRINCIPES NOUVEAUX DE DROIT
SOvmQUE 11-16 (1962).
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extra-judicial settlement, particularly in personal injury cases. In Soviet
Russia extra-judicial considerations were, and to a large extent continue
to be, determinative of the outcome of problems generated by human be-
havior on a scale hardly known in any other system.
On its face the Judiciary Act of 1922 and other Soviet enactments
in this field may seem to have many democratic features in the Western
meaning of the word, apt to mislead superficial observers. Thus (ir-
respective of whether popular participation in the government is advisable
only in the legislative and executive branch or also in the judicial), it
could appear that the democratization of the administration of justice
was certainly brought about by such institutions as lay assessors in the
courts, elected judges, and their responsibility with the possibility of their
recall.
Upon a closer investigation, the advantages of such a "democratic"
character of Soviet justice fade away for three reasons: first, resort
to methods of administering justice outside of the regular system of
courts; second, the way the courts were staffed and the way they func-
tioned; and third, the role attributed to the law and the legal profession
in the communist ideology.
Soon after the outbreak of the October Revolution, special Revolu-
tionary Tribunals were established 3 to crush the counter-revolutionaries,
help the new regime to rid itself of the opposition and enable it to become
more deeply entrenched. Indeed, they were unusually harsh whenever
the defendants appeared to be enemies of the new order. Summary judg-
ments and executions became routine.
Those special tribunals (abolished and replaced by military courts in
1922), with all their excesses and abuses, still had some features of judi-
cial bodies and (at least in theory) were subjected to some rules of pro-
cedure. The contrary was true as to some other devices set up by the
regime with the view of eliminating the "enemies of the people" from
public life by the usual method of taking away their life or at least deport-
ing them to faraway places, concentration or hard labor camps, where
they had hardly any chance to survive due to overwork, starvation, lack
of elementary medical care, and most primitive living conditions coupled
with harsh treatment on the part of the guards and rough climate.
The most effective method to achieve this goal was an extraordinary
committee known as the "Chrexvychaika" or Cheka which was granted
unlimited powers to investigate any possible threat to the new regime or
conspiracy against the government and to take any action however radical
13. Decree of Nov. 24, 1917, providing for the People's Tribunals as well as
Revolutionary Tribunals.
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that was deemed proper to eradicate the danger. Soon the Cheka became
the master of life and death of millions of citizens. It was not subject
to any control by the commissar (later: minister) of justice or courts.
It was independent from any interference on the part of other organs of
government and there were no appeals from its decisions. The lash of
the Cheka reached into the ranks of the communist party itself, and its
abuses became so flagrant that it was abolished after about four years of
wild activity.
However, the situation hardly improved as the job done by the Cheka
was continued by its successors. The next was the feared G.P.U. and,
after the establishment of the Union in 1923, the O.G.P.U. The story
repeated itself. Very soon this administrative organ became the most
powerful, lawless, and hated organ in the country. The same may be
said about the N.K.V.D., and later, the M.V.D., which took over the
problem of "state security" after the abolition of the G.P.U. 4
The notion of the "enemy of the people" became a catch-all term ap-
plicable to any one whose existence displeased the government or, some-
times, some influential governmental official. The best denunciation of
the sad state of affairs occasioned by those abuses was made by Khrush-
chev himself who accused Stalin of inventing this concept, adding:
"This term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression . .
against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who
were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad
reputations."' 5
In order that proper authorities might learn about the "enemies of
the people" and all instances of disloyalty or even criticism of the govern-
ment, the institution of the informer became deeply entrenched in the
Soviet system. Citizens were encouraged and even required in the name
of higher interests of the state and the party to spy on others and report
what they learned to the officials. This duty was imposed on everyone.
Pupils were to inform on their teachers, wives on their husbands, and
children on their parents. Those who complied were recognized as model
citizens of the Soviet Union, sometimes as real heroes. But they incurred
the wrath of the community in which they lived resulting in some in-
stances in physical reaction and violence which in turn brought about
bloody repressions. In a somewhat different context, the obligation of
the citizens to contribute to the preservation of the existing order has
been expressed in the statute on the Increase of the Role of the Society
14. It was followed by the M.G.B. and the K.G.B. See, Gsovsxi & GazymowsKr,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 564.
15. Gsovsxi & GRzyBowsxI, op. cit. supra note 4, at 881.
424
DOCUMENT
in the Protection of the Social Order.' 6
The whole atmosphere in the Soviet Union, at least during the long
Stalinist period, was one of terror.' Not only was this fact clear to
everyone, but it was even recognized by the government. One of the de-
crees, of September 5, 1918, was officially terned: "On the Red
Terror."'
In the light of the extra-judicial methods of dealing with a person
suspected of an unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet reality (and in
general, "suspicion was tantamount to guilt"),"° it would seem that a de-
fendant accused of a political crime would be happy to be brought before
a regular court. In fact, he had little reason to rejoice. The odds against
him were still tremendous, and in the great majority of cases his fate was
sealed in advance of the trial. This was due to the second factor to be
considered in examining the administration of justice in the Soviet
Union: the method of staffing the courts, the way they were function-
ing, and the procedures which were applied in order to bring about a de-
sired result of the case.
The quality, integrity and independence of the judges determines,
according to the traditional approach, the level of the administration of
justice in a given society. It has been rightfully observed that good
judges may efficiently function in a poorly organized judicial system
"just as a good mechanic can sometimes do excellent work with a poor
machine.""
In the Soviet Union, particularly in the early years, qualities of
competence, integrity, and independence in judges were discouraged by
the method of their selection. Being well versed in the law was not re-
quired. Political reliability was the test for eligibility. By virtue of art.
11 of the Judiciary Act of 1922, in order to become a People's Judge,
one had to have the right "to vote, and to be elected to Soviets," and a
two year record of "responsible political work" or three years experience
working in "organs of Soviet justice" at a stated level. Thus, uncertain
elements were eliminated.
Whether the judges were elected by the Soviets' or the general elec-
16. Art. 1 of the statute states that "each Soviet citizen shall not only follow the
rules of law, but shall act as a law enforcement officer and demand that others conform
to the rules of socialist legal order." See GazyBowsmx, SOVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 260-
61 (1962).
17. For elaboration of this statement, see e.g., HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYsTEM oF
GOVERNMENT 66-80 (4th ed., 1964).
18. Gsovsxi & Gazynowsxi, op. cit. supra note 4, at 565-66.
19. Id. at 880.
20. Hallows & De Witt, The Need for Court Organization, 1954 Wis. L. REv. 376.
21. This was the general pattern until 1949. The communist party assured for
itself the selection of the members of the Soviets, who in turn elected the judges.
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torate, or appointed, the decisive factor was always the wish of the com-
munist party,22 and the position of a judge was usually held by party
members. It has been reported that by 1935 the percentage of commun-
ists in the judiciary reached 95.5 in the lower courts and 99.6 in the
higher courts, while in 1947 only 14.6% of judges and other high offi-
cials connected with the administration of justice had legal education at
the university level, and 21.8% had received some legal training at the
secondary level.2"
The traditional requirement that the judges should be independent
in the performance of their functions was ridiculed for a long time and
particularly by Vyshinsky who stated that such an approach "acquires,
under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship, a counter-revolutionary
character."2  After the enactment of the Constitution of 1936, its art.
112 which provided that "Judges shall be independent and subject only
to the law" was understood by Vyshinsky as referring to independence
from personal and local influences only.2" Some other commentators,
like Karev,26 agree that there is no question of independence of judges
from the policy of the party and the government. A typical statement
was laid down by Vyshinsky:
A court of whatever sort is an organ of the authority of
the class dominant in a given state, defending and guarding its
interests. . . . Bourgeois theorists strive to depict the court as
an organ above classes and apart from politics, acting, sup-
posedly, in the interests of all society and guided by commands
of law and justice common to all mankind, instead of by the
interests of the dominant class. Such a conception of the court's
essence and tasks is, of course, radically false. It has always
been an instrument in the hands of the dominant class, assuring
the strengthening of its dominance and the protection of its
interests.2
However, other communist commentators claim that Soviet judges
are independent in the true sense of the word. Curiously enough, after
undermining the very possibility of an independent judiciary, Vyshinsky
stated that "Soviet judges are independent, . . . being subordinated only
to the law, which sets forth the will of the entire people, is independent
22. The 1936 constitutional provision that lower judges would be elected directly
by the voters was not implemented until 1949.
23. Citing Soviet sources, Gsovssxi & GRzyBowsKI, op. cit. mipra note 4, at 517.
24. Id. at 520.
25. Ibid.
26. Gsovsxi & GRzvsowsKr, op. cit. supra note 4, at 521.
27. VYsHINsKY, THE LAw OF THE SovIET STATE 500 (1948).
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of all influence and inducements whatsoever in deciding specific court
matters."2
Even if a Soviet judge should have decided to be truly independent,
he would not be permitted to exercise his independence for long. If he
dared to displease the government, several ways were available to elimi-
nate him. First, there was always the possibility of resorting to repres-
sive measures imposed by the security agencies of the state. Second, the
judge could be recalled in the same manner in which he had been ap-
pointed or elected (see, for example, articles 13, 42, 57, of the judiciary
Act of 1922), with approval, in proper cases, of the commissar of justice.
Third, far from the idea of irremovability of judges denounced by Lenin
himself,2' the term of office of Soviet judges is unusually short, and after
its expiration the incumbent bears the risk of losing his job. By virtue of
the Judiciary Act of 1922, the judges of the People's Courts and of the
Provincial Courts were to be elected for only one year. In 1938, the term
was raised to three years for lower judges, and to five for higher judges,
and in 1958 the uniform term for all judges was set at five years." Be-
sides the possibility of recall, there were provisions about dismissal from
office for cause (by a court's decision or as an outcome of disciplinary
proceedings; articles 13, 42, 69, 84 of the Judiciary Act of 1922).
Again, there is no division of powers in the Soviet Union in the tra-
ditional sense, and the functioning of the courts and the decision-making
is supervised by other branches of the government. Thus, for example
art. 112 of the Constitution of 1936 provided that the Supreme Court of
the Union "is accountable to the Supreme Soviet . . . and, in the inter-
vals between its sessions, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ... ,
Indeed, the courts' power is delegated to them by the Supreme Soviet
(and the lower soviets) to which they are responsible. Should it be
deemed proper, the Supreme Soviet has the final authority to reverse a
judicial decision.Y And a control of the activities of the courts is exer-
cised by the ministries of justice.3
The institution of lay assessors (or "People's jurors") could bring
about an element of popular participation in the Soviet administration of
28. Id., at 514. The principle of the independence of the judges and assessors is
also expressed in art. 9 of the GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF COURTS
of 1958 and in art. 7 of the RUSSIAN JUDICIARY ACT OF 1960, invoking art. 116 of the
CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC.
29. VysHiNsxY, op. cit. supra note 27, at 512.
30. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF Coun-s, arts. 19, 20, 22, 24, 26.
31. The same provision is repeated in art. 2 of the STATUTE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE U.S.S.R., adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on February 12, 1957.
For English text, see DENISOV & KIRICHENHO, op. cit. supra note 10, at 438.
32. HAZARE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 171.
33. For details, see e.g., KULSxI, THE SoviET REGIME 291 (1956).
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justice. 4 The assessors are not comparable to jurors in the common law
world. They exercise the regular functions of a judge, deciding with the
professional member of the courts questions of law and fact. 5 How-
ever, because of the general atmosphere prevailing in the Soviet courts,
the assessors hardly ever dared to contradict their professional colleagues.
It seems that only one case was reported in which they outvoted a judge. 8
Besides, the selection of the assessors is such that it assures that they be
politically reliable. As Krylenko pointed out in his report (see below),
his system rejected "the principle of democratic elections from below,
which in political life always leads to a casual comer being elected," and
was founded on the principle "of singling out the staunchest representa-
tives of the proletariat. '3 7  And art. 21 of the Judiciary Act of 1922
required consideration in their selection, "the level of their political
development."
The seemingly "democratic" character of the Soviet courts was
further undermined by many different devices which deprived the ac-
cused of the chance to defend himself effectively. It would require a long
discussion to describe in full all the institutional and procedural rules
which made it often impossible for the defendant to exonerate himself
from the guilt attributed to him by the prosecutor with the judge often
appearing to act as a second prosecutor.8 Although some Soviet theor-
ists asserted that the centuries old presumption of innocence existed in
their legal system actual practice denied it repeatedly. 9 One of the critics
of the Stalinist era of lawlessness was Khrushchev who confirmed in his
denunciation of the older regime many facts branded by foreign observers
long ago as the very negation of justice: forced confessions obtained by
refined tortures, fabricated testimony, instructions given by the govern-
ment to the prosecutor to bring about the conviction of given persons by
any possible means.
The requirements of a fair trial and the rule "nulla poena sine lege"
meant little. Frequently, defendants were tried secretly, in absentia, or
without the benefit of a defense counsel. In some cases, during the period
from 1934 to 1956, trials in the absence of the accused were mandatory.
34. There were no assessors in Revolutionary Courts, but there are assessors in
other courts, including the Supreme Court of the Union.
35. The same is true in other European countries.
36. HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 17, at 177.
37. It will be noticed that Krylenko suggested that 50 per cent of the assessors be
drawn from among the labor classes, and 25 per cent from among the Red Army and
the peasants. In the final statute, the participation of the peasants was increased to 35
per cent at the expense of the military units.
38. HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 17, at 181.
39. Id. at 180; GsovsxI & GRzYBowsKr, op. cit. sufra note 4, at 904.
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Death sentences could not be appealed and were immediately executory."
And penalties could be imposed even before the law which provided for
them became effective, or by the application of "crime by analogy." The
famous art. 16 of the Russian Criminal Code of 1926 (no longer in
force) read as follows: "Where a socially dangerous act has not been
expressly dealt with in the present code, the basis and limits of responsi-
bility in respect thereof shall be determined in conformity with those
articles of the code which deal with the crimes most closely resembling it."
An interesting instance of sentencing a defendant to death without
the background of statutory authority in force at the time of the com-
mission of the crime was recently analyzed by Professor Berman who
spent the academic year 1961-1962 in Moscow. A decree of July 1, 1961,
provided for the possibility of imposing the penalty of death for "black
market" transactions in foreign currency. Applying the law retroactively,
the Supreme Court of the Russian Republic sentenced two speculators to
death. The rationalization of this result, given by some Soviet lawyers,
was that "it was an exceptional case and that the public-which means, of
course, the Party-had demanded it,"41 and that the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, by an edict which was never published, authorized the
Court to apply the law retroactively.
Soon after, the author and another American law professor had the
opportunity to meet a distinguished legal scholar from the Soviet Union.
During the conversation, the Russian jurist undertook to defend the out-
come of the above speculators' case. To the remark that the imposition
of a penalty which is not provided for in a law officially announced to
the general public before the time the crime is committed violates the
principles of legality, he answered that such a stand was too formalistic
and technical.
Certainly the approach to legal rules may be either flexible or not,
with a range of intermediate possible positions. It is also true that the
common law tends to protect rigidly the rights of the accused, and recent
developments in the United States have tended to make conviction ex-
tremely difficult if not impossible in many cases. Added to the old evi-
dentiary obstacles which prevent finding a defendant guilty who un-
doubtedly committed the crime, such as the hearsay rule or the inadmis-
sibility of unlawfully obtained evidence, are new ones. The Supreme
Court has excluded the use of a voluntary confession and required that at
every stage of the proceedings the defendant should have the advantage
40. Gsovsxi & GazYBowsxi, op. cit. supra note 4, at 883.
41. Berman, The Role of Soziet Jurists in the Struggle to Prevent a Return to
Stalinist Terror, 14 HAuv. L. S. BuLL., No. 3, at 3, 4 (Dec. 162).
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of counsel even if his crime is not a felony. Those rules, coupled with
the impossibility of the prosecution to appeal based on an excessively
broad interpretation of the protection against double jeopardy, make the
United States a country in which it is difficult to fight the criminal. In
their technical abidance by the defendant's constitutional rights in their
broadest possible construction, the courts neglect the rights of the general
public to protection against crime. The situation has deteriorated so
much that in an address delivered in January, 1965, the President of the
American Bar Association Lewis F. Powell asserted that there are good
reasons for criminals to think that crime does pay, that "slow and
fumbling justice can be evaded," and that "there is growing belief that
recent Supreme Court decisions have tipped the scales of justice too far
in favor of a criminal and subordinated the rights of law-abiding
citizens."42
This is one dangerous extreme for which the United States Supreme
Court is hardly to be felicitated. Another one is the Soviet approach ap-
plied in the speculators' case. The crime that they committed was not
a malum per se, and their conduct would not be objectionable in many le-
gal systems. Yet, without a law providing for a capital punishment at
the time of the offense they were sentenced to death. To some representa-
tives of the communist world the shock of a traditionalist may seem puz-
zling. What is the life of one person worth compared to the overall goals
of "progressive" social movements? Any objections may be branded as
obsolete sentimentalism or unreasonable formalism and technicality. Af-
ter all, in this case the defendants were clearly guilty. And the interests
of the society may require that even those who are not guilty be subjected
to punishment-either for the purpose of terror, or as victims of col-
lective responsibility, or else as a method of deterring some conduct and
serving as an example-such as provided for by a statute imposing a
penalty of exile on the members of a family of an escapee from the armed
forces to a foreign country even if they were unaware of his intention
to run away.4 3
Many of the differences between the administration of justice in the
traditional and communist systems are due to fundamentally opposite
42. U.P.I. release, January 29, 1965. Recently, Judge Desmond, Chief Judge of
the New York Court of Appeals, stated that the effect of the new Supreme Court deci-
sions is to deprive "the public, not just the prosecutors and the police, of reliable, con-
vincing, real evidence." Referring to the case of Mapp v. Ohio, the Judge asserted that
its rule does not protect the average citizen "who never needs it," and continued: "What
the rule does is to insure and safeguard the professional criminal . . ." New York
Times of April 30, 1966.
43. HAZARD, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE U.S.S.R. 108 (1953).
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views as to the very concept of the law and the role it should fulfill in
the society.
According to Marxist-Leninist ideas, economic relations are the ba-
sis of every society, and all the rest, including the law, are only a super-
structure, conditioned on the basis. All organs of a communist state,
whether falling into the category of essentially executive, legislative or
judicial, have one predominant duty: to advance the interests of the state
in accordance with communist ideas. A striking example is a provision
of the General Principles of the Organization of Courts of 1958 which,
repeating previous enactments to the same effect, requires the courts to
"educate the citizens of the U.S.S.R. in the spirit of devotion to the
country and the cause of communism." This is hardly an education in
the traditional meaning of the word. And yet, takirng some Soviet texts
and institutions on their face value, reinforced by comments received
from some communist jurists, some Western commentators seem to view
their legal system in the light of traditional ideas, seemingly misled by
words and appearances. Thus, a Belgian writer, after a superficial ven-
ture into the problem and a short visit to the communist countries com-
mitted in his comments the gravest mistake of a ccmparatist by taking
the printed word for granted without investigating the conditions in
which it is to be given effect.4
According to the communist doctrines, there is no such thing as ob-
jective justice. One of the recent treatises on "The Soviet Legal Sys-
tem" opens with the quotation of a statement by Lenin: "A law is a
political measure, it is politics." And as in a communist system the policy
is formulated by the party, it is inconceivable that a court might thwart
whatever decisions could be taken by the party. As the division of powers
is not a necessary attribute of the communist organiz:ation of the society,
the courts might as well not be established at all. It was decided to set
them up for some important reasons,46 but avowedly they were to main-
tain their political character. Said Krylenko: "Our judge is above all a
politician, a worker in the political field . . . and therefore he must
44. DEKKE S, op. cit. supra note 12. The author's fallacies have been pointed out
by HALL, ComPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 102 (1963). Mr. Dekkers admits
in the foreword to his booklet, that he "would never dare to publish those pages" without
the benefit of his conversations with jurists from M1oscow, Leringrad, Tbilisi, Varsaw,
Prague and Bratislava, whose "expertise is equal to their devotion." It would be
advisable to juxtapose Mr. Dekkers' work with studies going deeper into the problems,
such as e.g., HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 17, and in particular, with chapters: 4 on
Controlled fass Participation; 5 on Terror and its Rationalization; 9 on State Inter-
vention in Private Affairs; and 13 on The Peril-Points.
45. By HAZARD & SHAPIRO (1962).
46. Those reasons are discussed in HAZARD, op. cit. supra rote 17, at 169-71.
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know what the government wants and guide his work accordingly...,,7
Thus, the law is the dictate of the ruling class-it is an instrument
of class struggle, and it should be administered accordingly. Other stand-
ards were applied by the courts to an accused from the workers' and peas-
ants' class, and others to someone from former upper classes. 8 The so-
cial origin of the defendant, his past and economic situation could well
be the determinative factor in sentencing him.49 To what Vyshinsky had
to say in connection with the independence of the judges, may be added
his statement that "the courts represent various forms of the class strug-
gle of the proletarian dictatorship,"5 and Krylenko's remark that "the
court is, in the first place, an agency for the protection of the interests
of the ruling class and of a given social order."'
After what was said about the role of the courts and the judges in
the Soviet system, it is hardly necessary to add that the prosecutor is a
very powerful and feared person. That he has the right to appeal is not
a unique feature of the Soviet system52 (incidentally, he can appeal both
when he would like the penalty imposed by the court to be more severe or
less severe) ; but as Krylenko pointed out in his report (see below), the
prosecutor general was granted the power to "suspend" the decisions of
the Supreme Court and submit them for final determination to the Pre-
sidium of the Central Executive Committee."
Even since recent reforms, the role of the procurator in the U.S.S.R.
is strikingly more significant than in the traditional legeal systems ;54 thus
art. 14 of the General Principles of the Organization of Courts of 1958
provides that he "exercises control over the legality and the validity of
judicial decisions, criminal or civil . . .,"" which in other systems
would amount to usurping the function of the judiciary. And the procur-
ator general exercises "supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict
47. Gsovsxi & GRzvBowsxz, op. cit. supra note 4, at 516.
48. HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 17, at 66.
49. Gsovsxi & GRzYBowsxi, op. cit. supra note 4, at 880; HAZARD, op. cit. supra
note 43, at 98.
50. Gsovsia & GazvowsKi, op. cit. supra note 4, at 520.
51. Id. at 516.
52. However, in the Soviet system his right to appeal is broader than that of
private individuals who are permitted to appeal only once, to the immediately higher
court, while the right of the prosecutor is not so limited.
53. The powers of the procurator were settled in the statute of May 22, 1922,
five months before the adoption of the JuDIcIARY ACr.
54. An unorthodox observation is that the important role of the prosecutor is
obvious, for a keen person, from the very arrangement of his seat in the court room,
which indicates that this position is not inferior to that of the judges. Hazard, Furniture
Arrangement as a Symbol of Judicial Roles, 19 ETC., No. 2, p. 181 (July, 1962).
55. A similar provision is found in art. 22 of the ORDINANCE ON THE SUPERVISORY
POWERS OF THE PROCURATOR'S OFrIcE in the U.S.S.R., May 24, 1955.
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observance of the law by all ministries and institutions subordinated to
them, as well as by officials and citizens.
As to attorneys-at-law, their position can hardly be compared to that
in traditional legal systems. After an early attempt to eliminate the legal
profession altogether, it was decided to retain it on reorganized founda-
tions. Collegia or teams of lawyers were established in which they have
to practice collectively. The role of the attorney is relevant to the prob-
lem of the organization of courts inasmuch as they are also considered as
an element in the administration of justice. In exercising his duties in
the Soviet Union, a defense attorney in a criminal case had to proceed
with great caution. Traditionally, as Vyshinsky stated, their functions
were merely "tolerated," and anyhow, they were required to have high
political qualifications and to keep in mind primarily "the interests of the
building up of socialism" rather than those of their clients." Therefore,
having a defense attorney was sometimes of questionable value for a de-
fendant, the more so that a significant exception to the lawyer's duty to
keep in confidence information that he received from his client was his
obligation to decline the defense, and to report to proper authorities, in
case he learned about the preparation or commitment of a counter-
revolutionary crime."3 After the reforms of 1958-1960, the position of
defense attorneys became stronger. They are no longer treated by the
courts and the prosecutors, "with contempt and disfavor," 9 but all that
they can do for the defendant is to "point out the ur fortunate set of un-
favorable circumstances which, by a haphazard interplay, pushed the cul-
prit towards the commission of the crime. '"" The position of the Soviet
attorney "will undoubtedly never equal that of a lawyer in Western
Europe or of a lawyer in pre-revolutionary Russia."1
The foregoing observations should necessarily be kept in mind in
order to understand the conditions and atmosphere in which the judicial
system, laid down by the Judiciary Act of 1922, was to function for many
years. 2 A few other remarks are in order. First, most of what was said
56. Id. at art. 1, modeled after art. 113 of the Constitutior. For a detailed analysis
of the prosecutor's role, see MORGAN, SovIET ADuINIsTRATnm LEGALITY (1962).
57. Gsovsxci & GRZYBOWSKI, op. cit. supra note 4, at 561.
58. Strogovich, cited by KULSEI, TEE SoVIET Rm= 301 (1956). Besides, "[t]he
procedure of admission and threat of expulsion from the Bar association give a
guarantee to the Government that Soviet attorney will function in utter loyalty to the
Party." Ibid.




62. The immediate background and analysis of the act bas been given in detail
by HAZARD, SErTLING DIsPuTEs IN SoviL'r SocIETY 176 (1960).
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refers, quite naturally, to cases with a political or class flavor. In disputes
between private individuals of the same social origin and standing, in
which the party was absolutely not interested, there would be hardly any
reason to resort to any kind of pressures or unorthodox settlement of the
difficulty. Second, the act was enacted in the Russian Republic before
the Soviet Union as a kind of a federation was called into being. The
establishment of the Union and the drafting of its Constitution dates
back to 1923; and its final ratification took place on January 31, 1924.
A federal Judiciary Act was enacted in the same year. The Judiciary Act
of 1922 established the bases of the Soviet court structure for a long
period to follow. The next important federal statute on the court organi-
zation was enacted on August 16, 1938, after the 1936 Constitution went
into effect. The present Russian Judiciary Act was enacted on October
27, 1960, after the federal General Principles of the Organization of
Courts were adopted in 1958.
The judicial and extra-judicial ways of imposing penalties, as men-
tioned above, including the regular and long application of terror, seem
to be so revolting that the natural question arises: how is it possible that
such a situation could be tolerated for such a long period of time? There
is no single reason for it. One reason among many others is the innane
passiveness of the Russian people whose history accustomed them to suf-
fer under a yoke, be it that of a totalitarian Czarist regime or of a Stalin-
ist oppression.6" Another is the method by which the communist minor-
ity imposed and maintained its grasp on the country, where the slightest
opposition resulted in deportation, tortures, or death. Even so, indi-
vidual or mass resistance was often heavy, and resulted in a variety of
desperate acts including assassinations of some hated state officials or
party agitators and refusal to carry out the laws or regulations. Natur-
ally, savage reprisals followed, whole villages were exiled into Siberia
and in order to crush the anti-governmental opposition in the Ukraine,
literally millions of people were permitted to starve to death in the thir-
ties. A reflection of the desire to live without terror was manifested in
a spectacular way during the first weeks of the Soviet-German War in
1941, when large formations of the Red Army were surrendering to the
Germans often without fighting, the inhabitants of the towns and vil-
63. A typical example of this attitude was demonstrated by an inmate at the
Lubianka prison, who was confined because of a mere suspicion, without any evidence
of his counter-revolutionary activities or feelings. After being submitted to tortures
and initial despondency and bitterness, he found the measures against him as reasonable
and justified them on the ground that the authorities can take no risk: maybe, it is




lages were greeting the invaders with flowers, and the original advances
of the German army were spectacular. It is an easy guess to assert that
if the Nazis had been better politicians, and had known how to promote
friendly feelings towards themselves, the Soviet Union would have col-
lapsed. But for the victorious German forces, moderation and psychologi-
cal strategy seemed unnecessary. Hatred was the spritus movens of their
actions, and a show of force seemed the most persuasive weapon in all cir-
cumstances. This resulted in a haphazard display of atrocities on the con-
quered territories and inhuman treatment of prisoners of war, including
starvation and gas chambers. The news spread quickly and cemented
resistance which contributed to the final collapse of the Reich. It may be
recalled, again, that Soviet citizens who were found by the Allies on the
German territories, either as prisoners of war or forced laborers, were
reluctant to return to their country; as a matter of fact, thousands of
them refused to go. But the Allies forced them to go back. Suicides
among the repatriated were not uncommon.
And yet, one of the keen observers of the Soviet system, Professor
Hazard, states that the Soviet people appear "in the main to have ac-
cepted terror during Stalin's time as a necessary evil."64 That it was an
evil can hardly be controverted. But it does not seem that the author
was able to prove that it was necessary. The introductory statement to
Professor Berman's comments on his stay in Russia appears to be more
realistic: "In the Soviet Union today people in all walks of life welcome
their Government's condemnation of the terror of the Stalin era."6
The Russian Judiciary Act of 1922 was in force during the Stalin
era, which began not long after the death of Lenin in January of 1924.
After a short struggle for power following Stalin's death, Khrushchev
emerged as the strongman and founder of a new era, which unexpectedly
ended with his deposition in 1964. His criticism of Stalinist atrocities
brought about some theoretical as well as practical changes in the Soviet
system of government, in the direction of eliminating the most objec-
tionable practices amounting to the travesty of justice. It remains to be
seen whether Kosygin and Breshnev will establish an era of their own,
and what developments await the administration oi justice in the Soviet
Union under their leadership.
Two features of the recent reforms should be mentioned. First,
article 5 of the Federal General Principles of 1958 and of the Russian
Act of 1960 proclaim the principle of equality of the citizens before the
law and before the courts. A commentator observed that this provision
64. HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 62, at 71.
65. Berman, supra note 41, at 2.
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can possibly be understood by some students of the Soviet system as evi-
dence that the old class of "profiteers" disappeared from the Soviet
economy.6 Irrespective of factual considerations, the above provision
marks an important theoretical change in the approach of the Soviet legis-
lators to the administration of justice. The old dogma of class justice
seems not to obtain any longer.
However, the seeds which were being sown for a long time continue
to grow in various places. A good example is a recent study by a fore-
most Czech jurist who emphasizes the significance of the use of cyber-
netics in the realm of human behavior, and associates his attempt to make
use of quantitative methods in the field of law with the provision of art.
18, sec. 2, of the Czechoslovak Constitution which provides for the ap-
plication, "in the Society of toilers," of the "results of science relating to
the direction of society and the planning of its future development." 7
The author discusses the possibility of using cybernetic machines
for the purpose of arriving at judicial decisions. He distinguishes be-
tween simple and complex cases. In certain simple cases, after furnish-
ing to the machine all relevant facts, the machine will provide the proper
decision to the judge. Complex cases are those, in particular, in which
there are alleviating and aggravating circumstances to be taken into con-
sideration in the meting out of the penalty. In such a situation, the re-
sults arrived at by the machine (possibly, presented in a form of some
alternatives), will be only guides or suggestions for a decision ultimately
made by men.
In pointing out circumstances bearing on the severity of the punish-
ment, the author lingers on "the problem of the class consideration (class
consciousness) which, as is well known, is of great significance in law." 8
He proposes to feed the machine with the information as to the class
identity of, for example, the perpetrator of a crime, such as: worker;
privately operating farmer; farmer-member of a cooperative; official;
former capitalist, etc. The machine should be so arranged that, after
having received and digested the basic information, it would take into ac-
count also the class status of the accused. While the author points out
that the use of the machine in such a situation should not be mechanical,
as the machine cannot become "dialectical," he attaches importance to the
class background of the defendant as an element bearing on the penalty
66. Ancel, Introdiwtion to Centre Francais de Droit Compare, LA REFORME PENALE
SoVIETIQUE, p. L n. 1 (1962). The author mixed up the federal law of 1958 and the
judiciary Act of the Russian Republic of 1960.
67. My attention to this book was drawn by Professor Benes, of Indiana University,
who translated the relevant passages into English.
68. KNAPP, 0 MOZNOSTI POUZITI KYBERNETICKYCH METOD V PRAVU 111 (1963).
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to be imposed. 9
Another feature of the recent reforms is that apparently all justice
should be administered by a unified set of regular courts. Art. 7 of the
Federal General Principles of Criminal Law of Dec. 25, 1958, provided
as follows: "(A)dministration of justice in criminal matters belongs
exclusively to the court. Nobody may be declared guilty of committing
a crime and be subjected to penalty except by court sentence." However,
at least three exceptions have to be noted.
First, the Military Tribunals were retained. Their obligation is "to
combat any criminal encroachments on the security of the Soviet state, the
fighting capacity of the Armed Forces, military discipline and rules of
military service ... .""
Second, for minor acts of misbehavior, lack of discipline at work
and petty offenses, comradely courts may be established in the various
units of the Soviet life. They were first provided for in a decree of 1928
and subsequently came into near-oblivion before they were resurrected
as a consequence of Khrushchev's appeal for greater popular participation
in the administration of justice at the XXI Con!ress of 1959.1 The
present regulations of the comradely courts were enacted by a decree of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on July 3, 1961. Art. 1 of the law
indicated that their duties consist of "educating S'oviet citizens in the
spirit of communist attitude to work, . . . observance of the rules of
socialist coexistence, promoting with the Soviet people the spirit of
collectivism.....72
The most important exception to the rule that a penalty may be im-
posed only by judicial organs is provided for, in sonye Republics, by "para-
site" statutes. This time, the Russian Republic did not set the pattern,
but followed it, after some hesitation. The Russian statute 7' deplores the
fact that some persons "refuse to work honestly, . . . live from income
which does not come from work, . . . exercise prohibited professions,
engage in activities of free enterprise, in speculaticn, in begging, employ
salaried manpower, derive income from . . . exploiting personal automo-
69. Simultaneously with the publication of the book, the same author published
an article: Knapp, On the Application of Cybernetics of Law, 9 REv. CoNTEWP. L. 15
(1963). There is no discussion of the class background of the accused in the article.
70. DENxsov & KIRICHEN1O, SovEr STATE LAW 307 (1960). For a short descrip-
tion of Military Tribunals see, e.g., Fridieff, supra note 59, at 735-38.
71. Ancel, supra note 66, at LV; GRzYBOWSKI, Sovms LEGAL INSTITUTIONs 255
(1962).
72. GRzv nBowsxi, op. cit. supra note 71, at 256. For recent examples of cases
decided by the comradely court of Moscow University Law School, see Sharlet, Russi.s
Courts of Public Pressure, 200 The Nation, January 18, 1965, No. 3, p. 55. See also,
MORGAN, LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE (1963), chapter 7 on the Comrades' Courts.
73. Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic of May 4, 1961.
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biles or building grounds . . .and commit other anti-social acts."' 4 The
statute declares a severe fight against those "parasites," who are subjected
to an exile of two to five years with the obligation to work in places espe-
dally established for that purpose, and a forfeiture of their assets ac-
quired not by working. The penalties are imposed either by the People's
Tribunals, or by "social decisions reached by collectivities of toilers of
enterprises, workshops, administrations, organizations, kolkhozes. .... "
Such a decision can be taken after a warning to the "parasite" has been
left unheeded; it should be approved by the Executive Committee of the
local soviet, and cannot be appealed.
Such procedures like those envisaged by the rules on comradely
courts and parasite statutes, together with provisions on assessors and
lack of requirement that judges should have legal training, result in the
de-emphasizing of the importance of the law and the legal profession.
They may be a step in the direction of a classless society, foreseen by
Marx and Engels, "in which disputes would be settled by the spontaneous,
unofficial social pressure of the whole community, by the group sense of
right and wrong or at least of expediency." 7  The "withering away" of
the state and the law, predicted by the founders of communism, advanced
by Soviet jurists purged in the thirties and then postponed for an in-
definite period of time (until capitalism will disappear everywhere, and
communism reaches its final stage) may develop little by little, even
though abidance by "socialist legality" should be an important feature of
the society in the long period of transition. However, to every Marxist,
law is only a by-product of the economic foundations of the society, over-
shadowed by communist ideology, politics, etc. Therefore, the author
was not surprised when upon asking a prominent jurist from one of the
communist countries whether his son would study law, he received the
following answer: "Oh no! of course, he will do something more
reasonable !"
In this connection, it is interesting to note the striking decrease in the
number of students at many law schools in the Soviet Union (and par-
ticularly, in other republics than Russia). In 1963, there were less than
50% of law students as compared with 1956. There is an especially low
enrollment in law schools in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, and in
large cities like Kiev, Kishinev, Voronezh, Tashkent, Tbilisi, only 25
74. Listening to foreign broadcasts may also be treated as such an "anti-social act."
HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 62, at 79.
75. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 280 (1963).
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new law students are being admitted per year." If there are few candi-
dates, the conclusion may be that there is just lack of interest, and "more
reasonable" fields are being selected; if admissions are limited by the
authorities, maybe the government prefers that there should not be many
trained lawyers, at least in non-Russian Republics."
Enclosure 2 in Despatch No. 632
REPORT OF THE ACTING COMMISSAR OF JUSTICE, COMRADE KRYLE'¢KO, ON THE LEGISLATIVE
BILL CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET LAW CouR-Cs.
At the Night Session of the IV Session of the Central Executive Committee on
October 23, 1922. (Summary from the Shorthand Account reproduced in the Official
Publication ACT ORGANIZING LAW COURTS OF THE R.S.F.S.R., Moscow
Edition of the People's Commissariat of Justice, 1922.)
Krylenko first characterizes the old system, which contained two principles, as it
were: on the one hand there were the People's Courts, Sov iets of People's Judges,
and the Commissariat of Justice, while on the other hand there were tribunals: military,
transport, provincial, and supreme. The new law was to do away with this dualism and
give a unified system of law courts. The makers of the new law were confronted with
certain questions of greatest practical and political importance: first, who was eligible
for People's judge; secondly, how are People's Judges to be appointed; thirdly, how
are People's Judges to be recalled from their posts; fourthly, to whom are they sub-
ordinated; and fifthly, how are People's Jurors to be selected and appointed.
As regards the first question, who is eligible for People's judge, they must abandon
the idea that everybody is eligible. The Legislative Bill under discussion provides that
for this post is eligible only he who has active and passive suffrage, who has a previous
two-years' record in responsible proletarian, public, trade-unioa or party work, or, as
an alternative, who has been three years a People's Judge under the old system.
Concerning the second question: how are People's Judges appointed, the Bill provides
that candidates are to be proposed by the Provincial Court, and appointed for one
year by the Provincial Executive Committee, with the right to recall any Judge from
his post by resolution of the said Executive Committee, in which case the Commissariat
of Justice must be apprised of the motives underlying such r<call. The third question
is: to whom are the People's Judges subordinated. The Bill subordinates them to the
next higher court, the Provincial Court. This creates in the province a "strong fist,"
a legal center. And then the last question: how is the personnel of the People's Jurors
to be made up. In this respect the Bill professes deliberately its class character, in that
it provides that 50 percent of the jurors must be drawn frfm the labor classes, 25
percent from the Red Army, and 25 percent from "representatives of settlements,
volosts, etc." In each uyezd (county) a special "Distribution Commission" is to be
formed, which is to compile jurors' lists. The number of jvrors required per uyezd
(county) will vary between 800 and 1,000. This system deliberately breaks with "the
principle of democratic elections from below, which in political life always leads to a
casual comer being elected, while our system is based on th, openly avowed electric
principle of singling out the staunchest representatives of the proletariat." In this
fashion the primary court is formed, that court which deals with 92 percent of all
legal cases of the R.S.F.S.R., the People's Court with two juro,'s.
Now the next higher court. First of all, as regards the nme it is to be given, the
Bill proposes to call it the Provincial Tribunal (this name was eventually, after the
debates, changed to "Provincial Court."-Note by translator). This Provincial Tribunal
has three principal functions: first, it deals with cases of counter-revolution, banditism,
murders, etc.; generally speaking, with such transgressions of the law which entail
76. Izvestia, August 4, 1964; cited by Recit, Rechtswis.ienschaft und J.stizaus-
bildung, OST & WEST, November 15, 1964, v. 8, No. 6, p. 240. (Brought to my attention
by Dr. Fedynskyj, of Indiana University Law School.)
77. From among the five cities mentioned, only Voronezh i in the Russian Republic.
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severer punishment; the second function is that the Tribunal acts as court of appeal
in respect to lower court; and the third, that it is an organ of supervision. How are
the Provincial Tribunals to be constructed, with or without jurors? With a view to
observing uniformity of structure, the compilers of the Bill eventually decided to retain
for this court too the institute of jurors. But "political expediency" required that even
still greater vigor be exercised in the selection of jurors for the Provincial Tribunal.
The Bill provides that in each province a Commission of seven members shall be formed,
which will compile the list of jurors for the Provincial Tribunal. The jurors must have
a two-years' record of work in public organizations. There will be about 100 to 200
jurors per province, and each of them will have to sit on the jury about six days in
the year. Besides a Collegium of Appeals, the Provincial Tribunal is also to have a
Disciplinary Collegium, the task of which is to supervise the People's Judges and
People's Examining Magistrates. These Disciplinary Sections will deal only with two
kinds of offences: first, "conduct incompatible with the dignity of a legal worker," and
secondly, "the pronouncing by the judge of a number of verdicts, subsequently rescinded
by the higher courts, 'contradictory to the spirit of our Soviet laws'." "This latter
handle for the institution of disciplinary proceedings is given to the Provincial Tribunals
in order to maintain in legal practice a line of conduct which corresponds to the
principles of the central Soviet Power." The Provincial Tribunal is to consist of 15
members, and in its Presidium, that is in the President and the two Vice-Presidents,
special administrative and technical functions are to be vested. The Plenary Session
has the right to raise questions of "interpretation of laws in connection with a con-
crete case."
As regards the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R., it combines the functions of
the old Supreme Tribunal with all its Collegiums (Sections): Military, Transport,
Legal, and of Appeals, creating anew the Section for Civil Appeals, and taking over
from the Commissariat of Justice all functions of supreme control of jurisdiction. As
regards functions of administration and organization, this sphere of activity belongs,
according to the Bill, entirely to the Commissariat of Justice. Thus, the just and
expedient distribution of functions is one of the most signal achievements of the Bill.
Transport Tribunals are left only in eight large towns. Speaking of Courts-Martial,
Krylenko says that "their time was not come yet," they must still continue in existence,
but they are a branch of the general system of courts, and they are subordinated to
the Military Collegium (Section) of the Supreme Court.
The Plenary Session of the Supreme Court has the right to interpret the "Material"
laws and the laws of legal procedure. "But by no means all laws of the R.S.F.S.R.
We do not want to construct a new Senate." With a view to establishing closer contact
between the Supreme Court and the Commissariat of Justice, the Public Prosecutor-
General of the Republic is to be present at the sessions of the Supreme Court; he also
has the right to suspend verdicts of that Court, and to submit them for settlement to
the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. The members of the Supreme
Court are appointed and approved by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee,
the candidates to be nominated by the Commissar of Justice, and for military and
transport courts by the respective Commissars.
Turning once more to the military and transport courts, Krylenko admits that they
constitute a "gross drawback," that they "violate the whole system," but he contends
that at the present moment they cannot be done without. Incidentally it transpires that
these tribunals are without jurors. "There is one more drawback: that new system
is not as simple as our present system: The People's Judge with two jurors, and then
the same judge with six jurors. This simplicity had to be sacrificed to another aim,
the aim of establishing a uniform line of conduct in Soviet criminal law. I feel
constrained to point out that in our time, since we are resolved to have the New
Economic Policy 'in earnest and for a long time' (Words said by Lenin-Note by
Translator), it is necessary that we, the labor classes, have also law-courts of our
own and keep them well in our hands, in order to maintain our dictatorship as a means
of protecting the interests of the labor classes. This principal task has been clearly
expressed in Article I of the Bill, with the reading of which I am going to conclude
my report. That Article I reads as follows: "For the purpose of protecting the achieve-
ments of the proletarian revolution, safeguarding the interests of the State, the rights
of the toilers and their associates, the following uniform system of courts of justice
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shall function on the territory of the R.S.F.S.R." Should a bourgeois lawyer read this
article, he would say: "From this article it follows that your courts function, in the
first place, for the purpose of protecting the achievements of the proletarian revolution,
and in the second place for safeguarding the rights of the toilers and their associations"
in other words, they do not exist for the protection of rights of non-toilers and their
associations; and from the point of view of formal logic such a formulation of the
question would not be unfounded. To him we would reply: "Yes, you are perfectly right,
the interests of the toilers are that principal aim for which our courts exist. To that
aim we make subservient our entire system of administration of justice, that is to say
the formal weapon of class self-defense in the hands of the labor masses. If for these
aims, or on the road to the achievement of such aims, we hax e had, or in future shall
have, to trample underfoot the rights of non-toilers or their organizations, our courts
will not hesitate in doing so. .. ."
After this report was heard, a Commission was appointed to scrutinize the Bill.
At the session on October 31, 1922, the revised Bill was submitted to the Executive
Committee once more, and, after some minor amendments had been proposed and
accepted, it eventually passed "unanimously." One of these amendments was that the
middle court was called not the "Provincial Tribunal," but "Provincial Court."
Enclosure No. 3 in Despatch No. 632
ACr ORGANIZING THE SYsTnx oF LAW COURTS OF IHE R.S.F.S.R.
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee Concerning the Introduction of the
above Organizing Act, passed at the Fourth Session on October 31, 1922.
(Translation from the Official Publication of the Commissariat of Justice, Moscow,
1922.) Sjorslin v. I p. 233. The R.S.F.S.R. Judiciary Act of Oct. 31, 1922 (R.S.F.S.R.
Laws 1922, text 902).
The Fourth Session of the Central Executive Committee, having heard on October
31, 1922, the report of the Commissariat of Justice concerning the legislative Bill on
the organization of the law courts, as well as the amendmens proposed by the Com-
mission, has resolved on the following:
1. To accept the Bill as introduced by the Soviet of Commissars, together with the
amendments to it, and to let it become law throughout the territory of the R.S.F.S.R.
commencing January 1, 1923.
The Session of the Central Executive Committee invites the Executive Committees
of all allied republics to introduce this law as passed by the Session also on the
territories of their respective republics.
2. To make it incumbent upon the Central Executive Committte and the Com-
missariat of Justice to revise by that time, also the Code of Laws of Legal Procedure,
making it conform to the new law passed.
3. Being desirous, at the same time, of raising the personnel of the court workers
to a due level, the Session of the Central Executive Committee has resolved:
(a) To make it incumbent upon the Soviet of Commissars to improve the material
conditions of the legal workers carried on the State Supply Roll in a measure which
would correspond to the importance of the tasks entrusted to tFem; while the Provincial
Executive Committees should in a similar fashion attend to the needs of the legal
workers of these institutions which are maintained and supported on local resources;
(b) To make it incumbent upon the Commissariat of Justice and the Head-
Committee of Trade and Technical Instruction to elaborate with the least possible
delay, and to submit to the Soviet of Commissars a Bill concerning the opening, in the
course of the year 1923, of no fewer than 10 law schools in various localities, and of
one supreme law school in Moscow for the purpose of prepariig a body of experienced
legal workers.
Signed: President of the Central Executive Committee: M. Kalluim.
Commissar of Justice: Kursky.
Secretary to the Central Executive Committee: A. Enukidze.
November 11, 1922.
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Article 1. For the purpose of protecting the achievements of the proletarian
revolution, safeguarding the interests of the State, the rights of the toilers and their
associations, the following uniform system of courts of justice shall function on the
territory of the R.S.F.S.R.
1. The People's Court consisting of one permanent People's Judge.
2. The People's Court composed of the same permanent People's Judge and two
People's Jurors.
3. The Provincial Court.
4. The Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. and its Collegiums (Sections).
Article 2. For the examination of special cases which are more complicated, to deal
with which special knowledge and certain practice is required, and in view of the
particular danger inherent in criminal offenses of a certain kind to the military power
of the Republic, or to its economic welfare, the following special courts shall function
temporarily, parallel to the uniform system of People's Courts of the R.S.F.S.R.:
(a) for offenses endangering the firmness and the power of the Red Army, Military
Tribunals; (b) for more important offenses threatening the transport service, Military
Transport Tribunals; (c) for infractions of the Labor Laws, 4 Special Labor Sessions
of the People's Courts; (d) for cases in connection with land affairs, Land Com-
missions; and (e) for disputes concerning proprietary rights between State organs,
Central and Local Arbitration Commissions formed at the Soviet of Labor and Defense
and at the Provincial Economic Conferences. The principles of organization and the
functions of such courts are stipulated in Part IV, Chapter XII, of the present Act.
Article 3. The People's Judge, acting by himself or conjointly with two People's
Jurors, attends to his duties within his fixed district in the uyezd (county) or in' the
town. For such activity within his district he shall be responsible only to a court, or the
next higher legal institution in the fashion set forth below.
Article 4. The Provincial Court carries on its functions in the territory of that
province or oblast in which it is formed, and, apart from dealing with cases coming
within its competency, it exercizes supervision over all courts in the territory of the
province or oblast, except only the Travelling Sessions of the Supreme Court and the
Military and Military-Transport Tribunals.
Article 5. The competency of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. includes: legal
control of all courts of justice of the R.S.F.S.R. without exception, examination of
appeals against decisions of the Provincial Courts; examination, by way of control, of
any case on which a verdict has been pronounced by any court of justice of the
Republic; and trial of cases of particular importance to the State which in accordance
with law come within the competency of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R.
Article 6. General supervision over the observance of laws, control over the conduct
of preliminary examinations, and public prosecution in courts of law come within the
competency of the State Public Prosecution.
Article 7. For preliminary examination of offenses indictable before courts of
justice, People's Examining Magistrates are appointed who perform their duties within
fixed divisions and who are attached to certain courts of law, under the supervision
and control of the Public Prosecutors and the Provincial Courts.
Article 8. With a view to rendering the toilers legal assistance in civil cases, as
well as in criminal cases before Provincial Courts, Collegiate bodies of "legal defenders"
(counsel, solicitors?) are to be established under the control of the Provincial Courts.
Article 9. For the purpose of carrying out verdicts of court, the office of Bailiff
is to be created in connection with Provincial Courts and People's Courts; and the office
of Notary Public for the performance of acts required by the law.
Article 10. The competency, functions, and responsibilities of all above mentioned




Appointment and Recall of People's Judges, and People's Courts Divisions.
Article 11. For the office of People's Judge is eligible every male and female
citizen of the R.S.F.S.R. who is not disfranchised by verdict o; court, and who complies
with the following conditions:
(a) has the right to vote, and to be elected to Soviets,
(b) has not less than a two-years record of responsible political work in labor-
peasant public, trade-union, or party labor organization, or a three-years record of
practical work in organs of Soviet justice in capacities not below the office of People's
Examining Magistrate.
Note: Persons expelled from public organization for disgraceful conduct are not
eligible for the office of People's Judges.
Article 12. People's Judges are elected by the Provincial Executive Committees
after nomination by the Provincial Court or the Commissariat of Justice, according
to the number of People's Courts Divisions or Districts in the given province.
Article 13. People's Judges are elected for the period of one year, and may be
re-elected. People's Judges may be re-called prior to the exoiration of their term of
office, or transferred to other courts within the province, solely by resolution of the
Provincial Executive Committee which has appointed them, at the initiative of the
Commissar of Justice or the said Executive Committee itsalf. In the latter event,
however, the reasons for such a recall must be communicatnd in detail to the Com-
missar of Justice. Dismissal from the office of People's Juege may take place solely
by verdict of court, or in accordance with the provisions contained in Articles 69 to 84
of the present Act.
Article 14. The number of People's Courts Divisions i a each province, and the
boundaries of such divisions, are to be fixed each time by re.olution of the Provincial
Court, and approved by the Provincial Executive Committee and the Commissariat
of Justice. In the event the Commissariat of Justice does not agree with the fixing of
divisions, it is entitled to demand the establishment of a certain minimum of People's
Courts Division in the given province.
Chapter III
People's Jurors, and Impanelling of Jurors.
Article 15. For People's Juror are eligible all toiling citizens of the R.S.F.S.R.
of both sexes, who have the right to vote and to be elected to local Soviets.
Article 16. For the office of People's Juror are not eligible persons disfranchised
by verdict of court, or persons expelled from public and trade-union organizations for
disgraceful acts and conduct.
Article 17. Each People's Juror shall participate in cotrt proceedings no longer
than six days in the year, and his participation is to continua uninterrupted the whole
term fixed.
Note: Exceptions from this rule are mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 18. The lists of People's Jurors for each Peoale's Courts Division are
compiled on the basis of three jurors per week, that is to ,ay two jurors impanelled
and one in reserve, which makes a total (52x3) of 156; adding 25 percent -39- for
cases of nonappearance, and rounding the figure off, the total of jurors is fixed at two
hundred to each people's court per year.
Article 19. The lists of People's Jurors are to be compiled once a year, by
December 1. One month prior to that date a special Commission formed in each uyezd
(division) center assigns a corresponding number of candidates to be elected-according
to the number of People's Courts Divisions-to the industrial establishments, volosts
and military units situated in the territory of the uyezd.
Article 20. The Special Commission for the Nomination of Jurors is to be presided
over by a number of the local Uyezd Executive Committee, its members being the local
assistant of the Provincial Public Prosecutor and one of the People's Judges of the
uyezd. The candidates to be elected are to be assigned approximately as follows: 50 per
cent of the jurors are to be drawn from the labor classes, 3 per cent from the settle-
ments and volosts, and 15 per cent from military units. The lists of assigned vacancies
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are to be sent to the respective Divisional People's Judges, works and factory committees,
political commissars of military units, and volost executive committees.
Article 21. On receipt of the respective notice the works and factory committees,
as well as the other institutions mentioned in the previous article, "attend to the
election of candidates, taking into consideration the level of their political development";
the lists of candidates are exhibited for public notice at the works, on the premises
of the volost executive committees, labor clubs, etc., and in the course of one week
every toiler has the right to challenge any of the candidates, lodging his protest with the
institution which has compiled the list, and stating the motives of his protest. After
the protests have been scrutinized, the lists are sent by the respective institutions to
the People's Judge.
Article 22. The challenged candidates have the right to lodge their protests against
such challenges with the next higher analogous institution, the competent trade-union,
the Uyezd Executive Committee, or the Political Section of the next higher military
unit, etc., within one week, and these institutions are bound to consider and examine
such protest within a similar period of time.
Article 23. On receipt of the lists, the People's Judge forwards a copy of them
for confirmation to the President of the Uyezd Commission, and not waiting for their
definite confirmation, proceeds to impanel the juries, selecting the jurors by alphabet.
Article 24. On receipt of the lists from all People's Judges of the uyezd, the Uyezd
Commission (Article 20) compiles a general list from which it is entitled to exclude
any such persons that for some reason or another do not come up to the standard
required for a People's Juror, and of these included in the lists it compiles a special
list of People's Jurors for participation in the Travelling Sessions of the Provincial
Court.
Article 25. Persons excluded by the Uyezd Commission from the list of jurors
shall be entitled to lodge a protest against such exclusion with the local executive
committee the decision of which in this matter shall be regarded as final.
Article 26. On the arrival of the People's Jurors at the People's Court, the People's
Judge shall be bound to explain to them their rights and functions, to make each of them
sign a document to the effect that such explanation has been made to them, and to
receive from them the solemn promise to perform their duties in accordance with their
consciences.
Article 27. During the time the jurors are sitting on the jury they are to continue
to draw their wages at the places of their respective employment, including also the
time spent in travelling there and back. Persons drawing their means of subsistence
from agricultural labor or domestic handicraft shall receive an extra allowance per
diem fixed in accordance with the minimum wage in the given locality; such allowance
to be paid by the Uyezd Executive Committee to the order of the People's Judge.
Article 28. In the event of sickness or other lawful causes for non-appearance of
a juror to serve on the jury when his turn has arrived, his name shall automatically
be transferred to the end of the list, of which fact he shall -be apprised by the People's
judge.
Chapter IV
Location of People's Courts and the Judge's Offices. Accounts of the People's Judges.
Article 29. The address of the People's Court is to be brought to public notice.
The expenditure in connection with the maintenance of the People's Judge's office is to
be fixed by the People's Commissariat of Justice. The maintenance of the office shall
be charged to the local Provincial Executive Committees, the necessary funds to be
paid through the Provincial Court in accordance with Estimates.
Article 30. Each Divisional People's Court shall have a Secretary (Clerk of the
Court) who shall be confirmed in his office by the Provincial Court on the representa-
tion of the People's Judge. Persons disqualified by verdicts of court or excluded
from public organizations for disgraceful acts and conduct, shall not be eligible to the
office of Secretary of People's Court.
Article 31. Direct control over the People's Judge's activity, including also the
technical arrangements incumbent upon him, shall be exercised by the Provincial Court,
to which the People's Judge shall also be subordinated in a disciplinary sense. Shape
DOCUMENT
and form of accounts, to be rendered by the People's Judge, financial or of any other
description, and everything appertaining to them, shall be fixed by instructions of the
Commissariat of Justice, and by orders and explanation of the Provincial Court.
Chapter V
People's Examining Magistrates.
Article 32. The office of People's Examining Magistrates is established at:
(a) corresponding Magistrates Divisions,
(b) at the Criminal Section of the Provincial Court,
(c) at the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R.,
(d) at the Public Prosecution Department of the Commiss-riat of Justice, for
the purpose of carrying on urgent examinations in important cases.
Article 33. The examining magistrates of the Division are named "People's Exam-
ining Magistrates," these at the Provincial Courts are called "Senior Examining
Magistrates," and these at the Supreme Court or at the Public Prosecution Department
of the Commissariat, "Examining Magistrates for important affairs."
Article 34. To the office of Examining Magistrate are not eligible:
(a) persons disqualified by verdicts of court, or excluded from public organiza-
tions for disgraceful acts and conduct;
(b) persons who have not at least a two-years record of Soviet legal work in a
capacity not lower than that of Secretary of a People's Court, or who have
not passed a corresponding examination at the Provincial Court;
(c) persons who are not entitled to the vote at local Soviet elections;
(d) persons who during the civil war have been disloyal to the Soviet regime,
or have belonged to anti-Soviet political parties.
Article 35. The precincts of the Magisterial Divisions shall be fixed, and People's
Examining Magistrates appointed, by resolutions of the Proviacial Court which shall
require the sanction of the Provincial Executive committee zmd the Commissars of
Justice. People's Examining Magistrates may be removed from their offices by a mere
resolution of the court at its own initiative, or at the representation of the Provincial
Executive Committee or the Commissariat of Justice.
Article 36. Senior Examining Magistrates and Magistrate, for Important Affairs
shall be appointed, transferred, and recalled by resolutions of the respective institutions
to which they are attached. All these examining magistrates exercize their functions
throughout the territories within the scope of the respective institution to which they
are attached.
Article 37. The Divisional People's Examining Magistrate employs the services of
a secretary and a messenger. Funds for the maintenance of people's examining
magistrates are assigned by the Provincial Court, the same as for the maintenance of
People's Courts, in accordance with the estimates, from local resources. All the other
examining magistrates are paid from the general State funds.
Article 38. In their relations wvith courts, the Public Prosecution Department, organs
of investigation, and any other official authority, the examining magistrates shall be
guided by the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as by





Article 39. The Provincial Court functions:
(a) as the center of administration of justice in the province, and as the organ
for direct supervision of the subordinated People's Co~arts;
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(b) as the organ for examining appeals lodged against the findings of the
subordinate people's courts, and private complaints filed against their
decisions of the mentioned courts;
(c) as lower court in cases specified by the law.
Article 40. In accordance with the above the Provincial Court is composed of a
President and two Vice-presidents, one of them for the Civil Section and the other for
the Criminal Section; twelve Permanent Members of the Provincial Court, and Pro-
vincial People's Jurors who are called up for services on the jury in accordance with
rules set forth below; further of a sufficient number of Provincial Court Secretaries
and other officials required by the Provincial Court and the Institutions attached to it,
in accordance with approved estimates.
Article 41. The president and the vice-presidents must have a record of not less
than three years practical legal work, in the capacity of people's judge or members of
the revolutionary tribunal, in addition to answering the requirements established for
filling the office of People's judges (see Article 11 of this Act). As Members of the
Provincial Court are eligible only persons who have worked not less than two years
in the above mentioned capacities.
Note: Deviations from this rule are admissible only with the consent of the
Commissariat of Justice.
Article 42. The president, vice-president and members of the Provincial Courts are
elected by the Provincial Executive Committee for one year, subject to the sanction
of the Commissar of Justice who in his turn has the right to nominate also his own
candidates for president, vice-president, and members of the Provincial Court. On
expiration of their term these persons may be reelected. The recall, however, or the
dismissal of a president (or vice-president) of the Provincial Court prior to the ex-
piration of his term by a mere resolution of the Provincial Executive Committee,
without the sanction of the Commissar of Justice, is absolutely inadmissible, unless
it is done in execution of a verdict of court, or ordered as a disciplinery measure by the
competent section of the Supreme Court. The same rules apply also to members of
the Provincial Court.
Article 43. In the event of the Commissar of Justice withholding his confirmation
of the elected president (and vice-president) of the Provincial Court, and the inability
of the Provincial Executive Committee to nominate other candidates, the Commissars
of Justice may appoint the said officials at his own discretion.
Article 44. People's Jurors for participation in the sessions of the Provincial Court
are called up in accordance with a special list of citizens who have a record of not
less than two years' work in public and trade-union organizations. Such lists shall be
compiled at the initiative of the Provincial Court by a special commission which is to
be presided over by a member of the Provincial Executive Committee specially appointed
by that Committee, two members of the Provincial Court as appointed by the President
of such Court, the Provincial Public Prosecutor, and three members of the Provincial
Trade Unions Soviet as appointed by the latter. The lists are subject to sanction by
the Provincial Executive Committee which has the right to challenge candidates, its
findings in this respect to be considered as final.
Article 45. The provincial People's jurors are elected to the number of no fewer
than 200 persons, of whom no fewer than 25 must be people's judges who are by
preference to participate in the sessions of the Civil Section of the Provincial Court.
The requirements stipulated in Articles 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 27 and 28 of this Act, and
referring to the jurors of people's courts, apply also to the jurors of the Provincial
Courts.
Article 46. As secretaries of sections of the Provincial Court shall be eligible
only persons who answer the conditions established for candidates for posts not lower
than People's Examining Magistrates.
One of the secretaries is to be named Senior Secretary of the Provincial Court.
Article 47. The remaining institutions and officials attached to the Provincial Court
shall function in accordance with rules specially to be established.
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Chapter VII
Functions of the Provincial Court.
Article 48. The President and the two Vice-presidents are wholly responsible for
the correct and lawful carrying on of work in the Provincial Court, and for correct
and lawful compliance with all existing rules and regulatiom, by the Court itself, as
well as all subordinate institutions.
Article 49. In accordance with the above, the competency of the President shall
be as follows:
(a) To distribute and appoint the duties of the members of the Provincial
Court of the various sections; to make representations to the Provincial
Executive Committee for confirmation of People's Judges and People's
Examining Magistrates; to ensure correct compilation, and in due time,
of the lists of People's Jurors; to ensure the issue of funds to the People's
Courts and the People's Examining Magistrates in due time; and to see
that their accounts are properly rendered; to compile and submit accounts
and reports concerning the Provincial Court and the People's Courts to the
Provincial Executive Committee and to the Commissariat of Justice; to
control the clerical work, as well as the financial, material, and other ac-
counts of the Provincial Court, and all correspondence of the Court with
the Commissariat of Justice and other departments of State; to control the
activity of notaries public and the body of legal dcfense, (attorneys-at-
law-Note by Translator.)
(b) To appoint plenary sessions of the Provincial Court, to preside over the
same, to examine all matters submitted, and to submit at his own initiative
to the plenary sessions of the Provincial Court matter within the
competency of that Court, including: preparation of material bearing upon
disciplinary responsibility of People's Examining M fagistrates, People's
Judges, members of the body of legal defense, and other officials; and
imposition of disciplinary punishment upon People's Judges, People's
Examining Magistrates, and other officials, as far as such power is vested
in the President.
Article 50. The Plenary Session of the Provincial Court is composed of all
members of the Court available at that moment, but of not lets than half of their total
number, the participation of the Provincial Public Prosecutor or his Assistant being
obligatory. The competency of the Plenary Sessions of the Coart is as follows:
(a) To deal with all questions concerning the fixing of the numbers and extent
of People's Courts Divisions; the transfer of Peopk's Judges within the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Court; the fixing of the numbers and extent
of Examining Magistrate's Divisions; the appointr ent and transfer of
such magistrates; the examination of accounts of pcople's judges and of
relevant reports of members of the Provincial Court oppointed for this
purpose by the President; the appointment of scrutiny commissions to
investigate the activity of people's judges and people's examining magi-
strates; and the examination of reports in connection with such scrutinies;
the elaboration of instructions and regulations relating to the conduct of
business of the Provincial Court.
(b) To examine all questions connected with the institution of disciplinary
proceedings against people's judges and people's ex:amining magistrates,
as well as other officials subordinate to the Provircial Court, including
members of the Provincial Court itself; to pass resolutions concerning
the temporary suspension from office of people's judges and people's
examining magistrates, pending final settlement of their cases; and to
arrange the appointment of the Disciplinary Collegiium of the Provincial
Court.
(c) To examine questions submitted by the president of the Provincial Court,
or by any separate session of the ordinary or the Appeals Section, or by
the Provincial Public Prosecutor, resulting from insufficient clearness or
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incompleteness of the existing laws; but solely, each time, in connection
with some concrete case or decision, and submitting at the same time all
considerations in connection with such questions to the Supreme Court.
Article 51. If the person presiding over the session agrees with the finding of the
plenary session-with the exception of cases mentioned in clause "c" of the previous
Article-such decision shall immediately be carried into effect; but if there is dis-
crepancy of opinion, the entire material shall be submitted to the Commissariat of
Justice or the Supreme Court, or the Provincial Executive Committee concerned, for
decision. If the Provincial Public Prosecutor objects to the finding of the plenary
session of the Provincial Court, such objection cannot delay the execution of such
decision of the Provincial Court.
Article 52. The Criminal Section of the Provincial Court consists of 7 permanent
members of the Provincial Court, including the Chief of the Section who is to be one
of the Vice-Presidents, and comprises the Criminal Sub-section, as well as the Sub-
section of Criminal Appeals. The sessions of the Sub-section of Appeals are composed
of three Permanent Members, and the sessions of the Criminal Sub-section of one
Permanent Member of the Provincial Court and two Provincial People's Jurors who
are called up from service by resolution of a special organizing session of the Criminal
Sub-section, according to the list of jurors in the possession of the Provincial Court.
The appointment of members of the Criminal Section to the Criminal and Appeals
sessions, as well as the appointment of presidents of travelling sessions of the Criminal
Sub-section, comes within the competency of the Vice-President presiding over the
Section, and requires the sanction of the President of the Provincial Court. The
President of the Provincial Court is free to preside, at his own discretion, at the hearing
of any case dealt with by the Appeals Sub-section of the Criminal section of the
Provincial Court.
Article 53. The Civil Section of the Provincial Court is to consist also of seven
members, including the Chief of the Section who is to be one of the Vice-Presidents,
and comprises the Civil Sub-section and the Sub-section of Civil Appeals. The latter
is to be composed of three Permanent Members of the Provincial Court, including
the Chief of the Section--one of the Vice-Presidents-and the former of one Permanent
Member who acts as president, and two People's Jurors drawn for perference from
the number of People's Judges enrolled as people's jurors (Article 45 of the Act).
The appointment of members of the Civil Section of the ordinary civil or appeals
sessions, as well as the appointment of presidents for the travelling sessions, rests
with the Chief of the Section and requires the sanction of the Presdient of the Provincial
Court. The People's Jurors are called up by a special organizing session of the
Section, at which session, however, participate only Permanent Members of the
Provincial Court. The President of the Provincial Court is free to preside, at his
own discretion, at the hearing of any appeal case by the Civil Section of the Provincial
Court.
Note: The re-arrangement of the members of the Provincial courts in sub-
sections, the forming of special bodies of members not belonging to one
or the other sub-section for the hearing of special cases, likewise the
application to the Commissariat of Justice for an increase of the number
of the members of the Provincial Court to meet contingencies, shall,
consequent upon the increase in the volume of work, come within the
competency of, and be attended to by, the President of the Provincial
Court, with the concurrence of both Vice-Presidents.
Article 54. The Disciplinary Collegium of the Privincial Court is to consist of
three persons, including the President or one of the Vice-Presidents of the Provincial
Court, all of whom are to be elected by the Plenary Session of the Provincial Court.
Part III
Chapter VIII
The Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R.
Article 55. The Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. (Article 5 of the Act) is to
comprise the following:
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(a) The Presidium of the Supreme Court;
(b) The Plenary Session of the Supreme Court;
(c) The Criminal and Civil Appeals Sections of the Supreme Court;
(d) The Legal Collegium, the Military and the Military-Transport Collegium
of the Supreme Court;
(e) The Disciplinary Collegium of the Supreme Court.
Article 56. The (appointment of) the President and the members of the Supreme
Court requires the sanction of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.
The President of the Supreme Court, the Vice-President, and the Chiefs (presidents)
of the Legal, the Military, and the Military-Transport Collegium are appointed direct
by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, while the remaining members
of the Supreme Court are appointed on the representation of the Commissar of Justice.
The members of the Military and of the Military-Transport Collegium are appointed
by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee on the representation of the
Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic and the Commissariat of Roads of
Communication, with the recommendation of the Commissar of Justice.
Article 57. The President and the Members of the Supreme Court cannot be
recalled or removed from their offices except by resolution of the Presidium of the
Central Executive Committee.
Note: All other officials attached to the Supreme Court and its component
sections and parts, public prosecutors, secretaries to legal collegiums, and
examining magistrates for important cases, are appointed and recalled
in accordance with rules and regulations existing in respect to such
offices.
Article 58. In autonomous republics and territorial unions there may be established
Territorial Branches of the Supreme Court by special resolutions of the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee; the Members of such Branch Courts are appointed
by the Central Executive Committees of the respective republics or by a special
Organizing Act which is to be sanctioned by the President of the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee; the President and the Vice-President of such Branches must,
however, at any rate be approved by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive
Committee.
Chapter IX
Limits of Competency of the Presidium and of the Plenary Sessions of the Supreme
Court.
Article 59. The President of the Supreme Court, the Vice-President, the Chiefs
of the Appeals Collegiums, the Chief of the Legal Collegium, and the Chiefs of the
Military-Transport Collegiums constitute the Presidium of the Supreme Court, the
competency of which is as follows:
1. Concerning the management and the administration of the Supreme Court
and its subordinate institutions and officials:
(a) The assigning of their duties to the various members of the Supreme
Court;
(b) The examination and confirmation of accounts and reports of the
separate Collegiums and sections, and the compiktion of accounts and
reports embracing the entire Supreme Court.
2. In respect of control of legal institutions:
(a) The appointment of special inquiries into, and investigation of, the
activity of provincial courts and other courts of equal status, at the
initiative of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic, and hearing the
results of such inquiries;
(b) The institution of disciplinary proceedings against the members of the
Supreme Court, the presidents of provincial court3 and of other courts
of equal status, as well as against vicepresidents, either in consequence
of inquiries held, or upon individual information received from the
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Public Prosecutor of the Republic, and the imposition of disciplinary
punishment upon the officials mentioned within the limits of the power
vested in the Presidium.
(c) The convoking of plenary sessions of the Supreme Court.
Note: At the sessions of the Presidium the Assistant Public Prosecutor
of the Republic (Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court) shall be
bound to participate with an advisory vote.
Article 60. The plenary sessions of the Supreme Court are to consist of all available
members of the Supreme Court, but of no fewer than one half of their number, and
shall be presided over by the President or the Vice-President; the Public Prosecutor
of the Republic or his Senior Assistant are bound to be present at such sessions;
the competency of the Sessions is as follows:
1. The correct interpretation of the laws concerning questions of "legal
practice," on the initiative of the various Collegiums or special sessions of
one or another Collegium, or on the representation of the Presidium of the
Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor of the Republic, or his Assistant
attached to the Supreme Court.
2. The investigation, alteration and revision of judgements of ordinary or
appeals collegiums of the Supreme Court and of any other court in the
Republic, on the representation of the Presidium of the Central Executive
Committee, the Public Prosecutor of the Republic, the Presidium of the
Supreme Court, and in consequence of protests lodged by the presidents of
the sessions of such collegiums or by the public prosecutors attached to them.
3. The election of the Disciplinary Collegium of the Supreme Court.
4. The examination of all other questions submitted to the Plenary Session of
the Supreme Court.
Chapter X
Personnel of the Appeals and Ordinary Collegiums (Sections) of the Supreme Court.
Article 61. The Appeals Sections function under the personal supervision and man-
agement of the President of the Supreme Court. His direct assistants in the Appeals
Section are the president's of the Criminal and Civil Appeals Sub-sections of the
Supreme Court. The President has the right to preside over the examination of any
case dealt with -by the appeals sub-sections.
Article 62. The ordinary session of an appeals collegium (sub-section) is to be
composed of three persons: the chairman, and two members out of the eight permanent
members of the appeals sub-sections (four per each sub-section).
To the Criminal and Civil Appeals sub-sections are attached two Assistant-Public
Prosecutors of the Supreme Court to each.
Article 63. The Vice-President of the Supreme Court has within his competency
all matters dealt with by the Supreme Court without previous examination by any
lower court; his direct assistants are the chairman of the judicial (ordinary) collegium
(section), and the chairman of the military and the military transport sections of the
Supreme Court.
Article 64. The Judicial (ordinary) Section consists of the Chairman (president)
of the Section, and four members. A session of the section is to be made up of three
participants, including the chairman. As chairman of the Judicial Section may act also
the Vice-President of the Supreme Court.
Two Assistant-Public Prosecutors of the Supreme Court are attached to the
Judicial Session.
Article 65. The Military and the Military-Transport Sections consist each of a
president, vice-president, and four members of the Supreme Court.
A session of each section is also to be composed of three participants, including
the chairman, and two members who are to be told off for duty by a mode to be fixed
by the president of each section.
To the military and the military-transport sections two assistant-public prosecutors
of the Supreme Court are attached, one to each.
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Article 66. For the judicial sections of the Supreme Tribunal a uniform preliminary
investigation department is to be established to be made up of examining magistrates
for important affairs; further a uniform record system for the registration of cases
under examination, which is to be under the supervision of the Public Prosecutor of the
Supreme Court and the Vice-President who has the entire judicial part of the Supreme
Court under him.
Article 67. The mode of appointing and approving member3 of sessions, of render-
ing accounts and reports, and of supervision of local military and military-transport
legal institutions subordinate to the military and military-traiisport sections is dealt
with by special rules set forth below (Chapter XII).
Article 68. The Disciplinary Section of the Supreme Court is composed of three
persons from the number of the Members of the Supreme Court, including the "pre-
siding member" of the Presidium, all of whom are elected by the Plenary Session
of the Supreme Court.
Chapter XI
Disciplinary Liability of Legal Workers.
Article 69. The Public Prosecutor of the Republic ha.,. the right to institute
disciplinary proceedings against all persons, without exception, working in legal institu-
tions of the R.S.F.S.R.
Article 70. The President of the Supreme Court ard the Assistant-Public
Prosecutor of the Republic attached to the Supreme Court have the right to institute
disciplinary proceedings in respect to all legal workers employed in institutions subordi-
nate to the Supreme Court, that is to say, presidents of scctions and members of
sections of the Supreme Court, presidents and vice-presidents of Provincial Courts and
courts of equal status, Provincial Public Prosecutors and th.- Assistants (deputies),
and all officials attached to the Provincial Court.
Article 71. The presidents of the Provincial Courts and Provincial Public
Prosecutors have the right to institute disciplinary proceediags against all persons
employed in institutions subordinate to the Provincial Courts.
Article 72. The president and the Public Prosecutors of the Military and the
Military-Transport Sections of the Supreme Court have the right to institute disciplinary
proceedings against all persons employed in subordinate institutions.
Article 73. As reasons for instituting disciplinary proceedings the following shall
be regarded:
(a) Offences committed by, and conduct or actions of, lEgal workers, which,
although not constituting criminal offences, are yet incompatible with the
dignity of legal workers, irrespective of whether such conduct or actions
have taken place while in an official capacity or not.
(b) Revision, by the Supreme Court, of a number of judgements and findings
pronounced by legal workers, which are not in keeping with the general
spirit of the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. and the interests of the masses of
the toilers.
Articles 74. The following disciplinary punishments may be imposed:
(a) Reprimand;
(b) Severe reprimand;
(c) Transfer and reduction to a lower grade of office;
(d) Dismissal from service and withdrawal of the right to work in legal
capacities for a fixed period.
Article 75. Disciplinary proceedings may be instituted not later than one year
after the incriminated offence has been committed.
Article 76. Disciplinary proceedings instituted in consequence of a complaint lodged
by a private person cannot be dropped at the request of the complainant.
Article 77. Prior to the trial of the case by the Disciplinary Section the latter is
to collect the necessary evidence, to hear the explanations of the accused, and may
instruct a member of the Section, or a member of the Provincial Court, or a People's
Judge, as the case may be, to conduct personal investigation.
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Article 78. The Disciplinary Section shall inform the accused of the date when
the case is to be examined, and the accused may be present at the session to give
personal explanations.
Article 79. If required the Disciplinary Section may summon the accused to appear
at the trial, in which case it shall be compulsory for the accused to put in an appearance.
Article 80. The Disciplinary Section is not bound to any formalities; the mode of
conducting the case is entirely left to the discretion of the Section, on the condition,
however, that if the Section resolves to hear the Public Prosecutor on the subject, it
shall also after him hear the accused.
Article 81. Members of the Section may be challenged in the ordinary way.
Article 82. The decisions of the Disciplinary Section are called "resolutions," the
records of the sessions are to be kept in the form of records of the organizing sessions
of the court, stating the names of the persons present at the session.
Article 83. Appeals against resolutions of disciplinary sections of Provincial
Courts may be lodged with the Supreme Court within seven days. Resolutions of the
Disciplinary Section of the Supreme Court cannot be appealed against.
Article 84. If, in the case dealt with, the Disciplinary Section perceives character-
istics of an indictable criminal offence, the Section shall be held to suspend proceedings
and to hand over the case to the competent criminal investigation authorities.
Part IV
Chapter XII
Special Judicial Institutions (Courts) for Special Offenses.
Article 85. The military and military-transport legal institutions of the R.S.F.S.R.
and of all allied and autonomous Republics function under the general control and
supervision of the Commissariat of Justice and the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R.
The organization and the immediate supervision over the activity of the military and
military-transport legal institutions are incumbent upon the Military and the Military-
Transport Sections of the Supreme Court.
Article 86. The following are military legal institutions:
(a) Military District or Front Tribunals-attached to the Revolutionary
Military Soviets of Military Districts or Fronts;
(b) Military Corps Tribunals-attached to Army Corps;
(c) Divisional Sections of District Tribunals-attached to divisions;
In times of war or at the theater of war Military Army Tribunals or Military
territorial Tribunals may be organized in addition to the above; also branches of
Military Corps Tribunals may be attached to divisions on active service in the field.
The number of Military Tribunals in action, in times or war as well as of peace, shall
be fixed each time by resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Court, on the
representation of the Military Section of the Supreme Court.
Article 87. Transport Tribunals are established:
In Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Omsk, Tashkent, and Smolensk.
The liquidation of existing transport tribunals, and the foundation of new ones,
are to take place by resolution, each time, of the Presidium of the Supreme Court, on
the representation of the Military-Transport Section of the Supreme Court.
Article 88. The Military Tribunal of the District of the Front is to consist of its
President, Vice-President, and four members elected by the Military Section from the
number of candidates nominated by the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the District
or the Front, or by the commander of the forces, and approved by the Military
Collegium, with the concurrence of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic.
The Military Corps Tribunal consists of a President and four members selected
by the Military Section of the Supreme Court from the number of candidates nominated
by the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the District or the Front.
The Military Tribunal of the Division consists of President, Vice-President, and
four members approved by the Military Tribunal of the District or the Front.
Article 89. The Transport Tribunals consist of a President, a Vice-president, and
four Members, nominated by the District Plenipotentiary of the Commissariat of Roads
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of Communication and approved by the Military-Transport Section of the Supreme
Court, with the concurrence of the Commissariat of Ways of Communication.
Note: According to the volume of business to be dealt with, the number of
members may in the separate Transport Tribunals be increased to seven,
by resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Court.
Article 90. The Military and Military-Transport Sections have the right to transfer
and remove at any time the presidents and the members o,. Military and Transport
Tribunals, giving notice of it at the same time to the Revolutionary Military Soviets
concerned, or to the Commissar of Ways of Communication.
Article 91. In all disciplinary matters the Military Tribunals attached to the
districts corps and armies, and the Transport District Tribunals, are subordinate to the
Disciplinary Section of the Supreme Court; and the Military Tribunals at the
divisions-to the disciplinary sections of the Military District and Corps Tribunals.
Article 92. Labor Sessions of People's Courts are to be formed at each Provincial
Court, and are to consist of one permanent people's judge, and two permanent members
of court: one appointed by the local Provincial Trade Union Soviet, and the other by
the local Provincial Labor Section; and shall function in the same fashion, and accord-
ing to the same rules as the People's Courts.
Article 93. Appeals against decisions of the Labor Session are to be lodged in the
usual fashion with the Provincial Court which is charged with immediate supervision
and control of the Labor Sessions of the People's Court (Article 4 of the Act.)
Conditions of eligibility to the post of people's judge pre.iding over labor session,
and the mode of his appointment and recall, are the same as in the case of all other
People's Courts of the province.
Article 94. The Land and Arbitration Commissions formed for the settlement of
land and property disputes between State organs (decree of May 24, 1922, Collection
of Laws, 1922, No. 428; and decree of September 21, 1922, Collection of Laws, 1922,
No. 769) function in accordance with their respective promulgated organization acts,
and are subordinate to the Commissariat of Justice and its organs; in the province-to
the plenary sessions of the Provincial Courts and the Public Prosecutor's Department,
and in the center-to the Supreme Court and the Public Proscutor of the Republic
(Articles 4, 5 and cause 2 of Article 60 of the Act).
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